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COMMENT
UNITED STATES V. AWADALLAH:
UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU TO SPEND
EIGHTY-THREE DAYS BEHIND BARS? AN




"But when they had stretched him out for the whips, Paul said to
the centurion on duty, 'Is it lawful for you to scourge a man who
is a Roman citizen and has not been tried?'.. . At once those who
were going to interrogate him backed away from him, and the
commander became alarmed when he realized that he was a
Roman citizen and that he had had him bound."'
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the terrorist attacks on the United States of
America on September 11, 2001, the stage has been set for a
heated struggle between lawmakers and the judiciary over the
appropriate parameters within which law enforcement officials
may conduct criminal investigations. 2 A traumatized nation has
t J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 2001,
Georgetown University.
1 Acts 22:25-29.
2 See Adam Liptak, After September 11, A Legal Battle on the Limits of Civil
Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at Al (describing the Department of Justice's
response to the terrorist attacks and a "sprawling legal battle, now being waged in
federal courthouses around the country that experts say has begun to redefine the
delicate balance between individual liberties and national security"). But see WAYNE
D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 281 (1996)
("According to unitary schemes, moreover, governmental powers and the People's
rights and powers are largely complementary and overlapping. Public officials act
on behalf of the People to secure shared rights, common interests, collective goods,
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol.78:185
afforded Congress tremendous latitude in enacting legislation
designed to accommodate the swift and efficient recovery of
information. 3 Accordingly, the judiciary confronts two distinct
challenges: (1) interpreting the aggressive use of statutes related
to detention and searches and (2) assessing the constitutionality
thereof.4 Recently, in United States v. Awadallah,5 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
elucidated the murky contours of detaining individuals who are
not suspected of having committed a crime and held that the
federal material witness statute6  does not authorize the
detention of witnesses for grand jury investigations. 7
In Awadallah, FBI agents initially arrested the defendant as
a material witness for grand jury proceedings, focusing on the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.8 Three hours after the
arrest, a magistrate judge of the Southern District of New York
issued a warrant for arrest pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3144. 9 For
twenty days thereafter, Awadallah was held as a "high security
and the like.").
3 See Robert Pierre, Wisconsin Senator Emerges as a Maverick; Feingold, Who
Did Not Back Anti-Terrorism Bill, Says He Just Votes His Conscience, WASHINGTON
POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at A8 (discussing how the Patriot Act gives the government, in
federal criminal investigations, the power to secretly search homes and offices and
allows the police to "compel the disclosure of medical or educational records of
anyone with even a casual knowledge of a suspected terrorist").
4 See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Judge Rules Against U.S. on Material-Witness
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at A10 (explaining how Judge Scheindlin of the
Southern District of New York held that the government could not use a law to
detain a material witness for a grand jury investigation).
5 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
6 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000). This section provides:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a
person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may
become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a
judicial officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the person in
accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title. No material
witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any condition
of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by
deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of
justice. Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable
period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Id.
7 See Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 58 ("Properly read, the statute only allows
a witness to be detained until his testimony may be secured by deposition in the




inmate"10 in prisons around the country, and on October 10,
2001, he testified before a grand jury in New York.11
Awadallah testified that he had met two of the hijackers1 2 at
work and in his mosque but that he had not seen either of them
for a year prior to the attacks. 13 In addition, he testified before
the grand jury that he did not know anyone by the name of
"Khalid,"14 one of the hijackers.1 5 The Assistant United States
Attorney, however, presented one of Awadallah's exam booklets
from school that referred to this hijacker by name.1 6
Consequently, Awadallah was charged with two counts of
"knowingly making a false material declaration before the grand
jury."1 7 In total, Awadallah remained in prison for eighty-three
days. 18
District Judge Scheindlin explained that "since 1789, no
Congress has granted the government the authority to imprison
an innocent person in order to guarantee that he will testify
before a grand jury conducting a criminal investigation."19
Conceding that the language of the federal material witness
statute "may create some uncertainty,"20 Judge Scheindlin
determined that the phrase "criminal proceeding" does not
include a grand jury proceeding. 21 In support of this position,
the court emphasized that the detention of witnesses runs
contrary to the purpose of a grand jury investigation, namely "to
protect individuals from the vast power of the government."22
Application of 18 U.S.C. § 3144 to grand jury proceedings would
10 Id.
11 Id. The grand jury was assembled to investigate the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. Id.
12 The two hijackers were NawafAl-Hazmi and Khalid A1-Mihdar. Id. at 58-59.
13 Id. Awadallah testified that he had met A1-Hazmi approximately forty times.
Id. at 59.
14 Id. at 59.
15 Id. (referring to Khalid A1-Mihdar).
16 Id. When questioned before the grand jury a second time, Awadallah
admitted writing the name in his exam booklet. Id. He also indicated that he
believed that the man he had met was named Khalid. Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 82.
20 Id. at 62.
21 Id. at 76. After exhaustive statutory interpretation, the court noted that
"[a]pplying section 3144 to a grand jury proceeding is an attempt to fit a square peg
into a round hole." Id. at 64.
22 Id. at 62 n.12.
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also demand that the courts afford great deference to the
prosecutor. 23 With regard to the sole appellate case that dealt
with the statute's application to grand jury proceedings, 24 the
court found that such holding was not binding on the court, the
relevant sections of the case were dicta, and the case was
wrongly decided. 25 It therefore held that the federal material
witness statute is not applicable to grand jury investigations. 26
In particular, 18 U.S.C. § 3144 did not authorize Awadallah's
detention, and his testimony before the grand jury was
suppressed. 27
In reaching this conclusion, the court did not address the
question of the constitutionality of detaining material witnesses
for grand jury proceedings. Nonetheless, Judge Scheindlin
expressed significant doubt that such detentions would pass
constitutional muster.28 The court elucidated the competing
interests at stake with regard to detaining individuals presumed
to have information about the commission of crimes. 29 Given the
existing avenues available to law enforcement officials 30 and the
23 Id. at 63. The court expressed concern that an overbroad reading of the
statute would make the court dependent on the prosecutor's assessment of which
witnesses were material. Id. ("[f a judge abdicates her role by delegating her
authority to the government, she reads the materiality requirement out of the
statute."). See also PAUL S. DIAMOND, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4.03(F) (4th ed. 2001) ("[Tjhe prosecutor need not aver why he
believes the testimony is material.").
24 Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 934 (9th Cir. 1971) (analyzing the
federal material witness statute within the context of grand jury testimony).
25 Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
26 See id.
27 Id. at 82.
28 See id. ("A proper respect for the laws that Congress does enact-as well as
the inalienable right to liberty-prohibits this Court from rewriting the law, no
matter how exigent the circumstances.").
29 Id. at 77. ("'To determine the constitutionality of a seizure we must balance
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion.' ") (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). The court observed
that there is only one "legitimate reason" to detain a witness such as Awadallah and
that is "to aid in 'an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any
person."' Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974)).
30 See Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 77 n.28. The court described, for example,
the power to arrest under ordinary circumstances. Id. ("If there is probable cause to
believe an individual has committed a crime or is conspiring to commit a crime, then
the government may lawfully arrest that person, but only upon such a showing.").
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uncontested powers of the grand jury,31 the court concluded that
liberty was an exorbitant price to pay for this potentially fruitful
method of anticipating future criminal behavior. 32
It is suggested that the federal material witness statute
affords the government statutory authority to detain witnesses
in connection with grand jury investigations. This Comment
submits that the Awadallah court erred when it found that 18
U.S.C. § 3144 was inapplicable to the defendant's detention. 33
Such detention, however, did constitute a violation of
Awadallah's Fourth Amendment rights. Contrary to the
rationale of the court, a grand jury proceeding may be accurately
characterized as a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the
statute. A court may also appropriately defer to the prosecutor,
to the extent necessary, in order to determine the materiality of
a witness' testimony.
The court's analysis of the constitutional implications of
detaining individuals who are not suspected of criminal
misconduct is a well-reasoned application of the Fourth
Amendment to the complex balance between liberty interests
and governmental authority to investigate crimes. By positing
viable alternatives to material witness detention, the court
effectively demonstrated that the governmental interests at
stake were not as great as they might initially appear. 34
Namely, the power of the grand jury to petition the court for a
subpoena of such a witness should necessarily precede the
31 See id. at 78 ('The grand jury already has the ability to ask a court to
subpoena an individual who must then testify or face criminal sanctions.'). See also
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.
32 Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (stating that "even when such detentions
might be useful, it must be balanced against a witness's fundamental right to
liberty"). The court criticized Attorney General Ashcroft for misuse of the statute.
See id. n.28 ("Relying on the material witness statute to detain people who are
presumed innocent under our Constitution in order to prevent potential crimes is an
illegitimate use of the statute.").
33 Although Awadallah was not indicted until October 31, 2001, he is, for the
sake of clarity, referred to by his name or "the defendant" throughout this
Comment. See id. at 59. Until October 10, 2001, he was being held solely as a
witness. See id. at 58-59.
34 See id. at 78 (describing subpoena and deposition alternatives to the arrest of
a material witness). In response to the government's contention that the
"'inevitable discovery' doctrine" prevented the suppression of Awadallah's
testimony, the court explained that, had Awadallah been subpoenaed, his testimony
may have been substantially different because "he would have testified at liberty
and not after twenty days in custody" and would not "have been required to testify
while handcuffed to a chair." Id. at 82.
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drastic step of imprisoning an individual without probable cause
to believe that he or she has committed a crime.
I. THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF WITNESSES AND THE
BACKGROUND OF THE FEDERAL MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE
The concept of a material witness in a criminal proceeding
has its origins in English common law. 35 The current version of
the federal material witness statute originates from the Bail
Reform Act of 1966.36 The aim of the legislation was to make
certain that defendants would attend their trials.37 The passage
of the Act effectuated the first dramatic alteration to federal bail
law in nearly two centuries. 38 One notable way in which the Act
altered federal bail law was the use of "nonmonetary conditions"
35 See Stacey M. Studnicki, Material Witness Detention: Justice Served or
Denied? 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1533, 1535 (1994) ("In criminal cases, the date when
process began to be issued for the Crown's witnesses has been the subject of much
debate. Most scholars agree that the second Act of Philip and Mary in 1555 enabled
the Crown to bind over witnesses to appear at criminal proceedings .. "). The
ability to compel testimony was codified by the late sixteenth century. See id. at
1536 ("The compulsion of Crown witnesses to appear and testify was firmly in place
by 1695, when the Act of William III gave parties indicted for treason like process to
compel their witnesses to appear, as was usually granted to compel witnesses to
appear against them."); see also Laurie L. Levinson, Detention, Material Witnesses &
the War on Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1222 (2002) ("The designation of
material witnesses dates back to Common Law. The original concept was that
individuals who have relevant testimony regarding a case have a responsibility to
appear as witnesses.").
36 See Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3149, 80 Stat. 214, 216 (1966) (granting power to
the judicial officer to detain a material witness when "it may become impracticable
to secure his presence by subpoena [sic]" and when the witness cannot "adequately
be secured by deposition .... ).
37 Douglas J. Klein, The Pretrial Detention "Crisis" The Causes and the Cure,
52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 281, 283 (1997) (discussing the Act, its
subsequent revision, and explaining that "[t]he impetus for the revision was the
inability of the 1966 Act to protect society from crimes committed by accused
criminals while out on bail").
38 Krista Ward & Todd R. Wright, Pretrial Detention Based Solely on
Community Danger: A Practical Dilemma, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, 111.1 ("Federal
bail law has its genesis in the Judiciary Act of 1789 .... Federal bail law remained
substantially unchanged for the next 177 years .... [The law changed upon ] the
adoption by Congress of the Bail Reform Act of 1966."); see also id. at 111.2 ("Prior to
1966, monetary bonds were the exclusive means upon which federal courts relied to
assure the appearance of a defendant at future proceedings."). For background on
bail reform and the political and academic movements to that end, see WAYNE H.
THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 3 (1976). ("Few legal practices comport
more closely with the American legal principles of equal justice and innocence until
proven guilty than that of releasing a criminal defendant on his own recognizance,
his personal promise to appear.").
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to guarantee that accused individuals would be present at their
trials. 39 This alteration had the positive effect of leveling the
playing field among defendants from various socioeconomic
strata.40 Congress later amended the 1966 Act, including the
provisions related to material witnesses. 41 With the Bail Reform
Act of 1984, Congress went to great lengths to clarify the
circumstances under which material witnesses may be
detained.42 The legislative history of the 1984 Act indicates that
Congress intended to codify the appellate common law on point.43
In particular, the Senate report cited United States v. Bacon44 in
discussing the proceedings to which the statute would be
applicable. 45 Notably, the report stated that "[a] grand jury
investigation is a 'criminal proceeding' within the meaning of
this section."46
39 See Ward & Wright, supra note 38, at 111.2.
40 See Bruce D. Pringle, Bail and Detention in Federal Criminal Proceedings, 22
COLO. LAW. 913, 913 (1993) ("Prior to 1966, the federal courts relied almost
exclusively on monetary bonds as the means for assuring a defendant's presence for
court proceedings. However, this practice has the unacceptable effect of detaining
many defendants simply because they were unable to post bond.").
41 See Ward & Wright, supra note 38, at III.4 ("The Bail Reform Act of 1984
sought to remedy some of the most egregious problems of the 1966 Act."). For
instance, the 1984 Act required courts to consider "safety risks" when drafting the
conditions of release prior to trial. See Pringle, supra note 40, at 913.
42 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 28 (1983). The report stated:
The other change the Committee has made is to grant the judicial officer
not only the authority to set release conditions for a detained material
witness, or, in an appropriate case, to order his detention pending his
appearance at the criminal proceeding, but to authorize the arrest of the
witness in the first instance.
Id.
43 See id. at 28-29. The reported stated:
T]he Ninth Circuit found the power to arrest a material witness to be
implied in the grant of authority to release him on conditions under 18
U.S.C. 3149. In its research on the law, the court discovered that specific
arrest authority existed in Federal law from 1790 to 1948. The court
concluded that the dropping of the authority in the 1948 revision of
Federal criminal laws was inadvertent. The Committee agrees with that
conclusion and expressly approves the finding of the implied right to arrest
in the authority granted to the judicial officer to release on conditions that
is [sic] set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3149.
Id. (citing Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971)).
44 449 F.2d at 945 (holding that a warrant for the arrest of a material witness
in a grand jury proceeding was invalid absent a showing of probable cause).
45 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 28 n.88.
46 Id.
2004]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol.78:185
With the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Congress underlined the
crucial importance of securing the testimony of material
witnesses during criminal proceedings.47 In the federal system,
there are two primary methods for guaranteeing that a witness
will be present to testify during a grand jury investigation: (1) a
subpoena 48  and (2) an arrest warrant.49  Ordinarily, an
individual will not be arrested as a material witness unless
"there is probable cause to believe a person's appearance before a
grand jury cannot be accomplished through a subpoena"50 and
her testimony cannot be obtained by way of a deposition. 51 This
latter restriction on the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
material witnesses does not apply to grand jury proceedings. 52
II. THE GRAND JURY: THE GENESIS OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
The nature of a grand jury investigation was at the heart of
the Awadallah court's decision to read the federal material
witness statute to apply exclusively to a "pretrial" proceeding. 53
In particular, the court relied on the role of the grand jury,54 the
fact that there are no "parties" to its investigations,55 and the
difficulty of ascertaining the materiality of a particular witness's
testimony.56 The district court's statutory interpretation was
47 See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 3144, 98 Stat. 1976, 1982 (1984).
48 See SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORi E. SHAW, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO




52 See id. ('This limitation is seemingly not applicable to grand jury proceedings
because Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure only permits a
deposition to be taken to preserve testimony for use 'at trial.' "); see also Aguilar-
Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 413-14 (5th Cir. 1992).
53 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Properly read, the statue [sic] only
allows a witness to be detained until his testimony may be secured by deposition in
the pretrial, as opposed to the grand jury, context.").
54 See id. at 62 ("The grand jury is an investigatory body. Until it completes its
job, the criminal process cannot begin.") (quoting In re Schmidt, 775 F.2d 822, 824
(7th Cir. 1985)).
55 See id. at 62-63 ("A 'party' to a criminal proceeding does not exist until after
the grand jury has returned an indictment."). But see In re Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d
287, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (criticizing the interpretation in Awadallah and
emphasizing that "the word 'party' applies just as comfortably to any party in
interest, as the government is in a grand jury proceeding, and as both the
government and a defendant are after an indictment").
56 Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 63 ("Because there is no reasonable way to
determine whether a witness's testimony is material to the grand jury investigation,
2004] MATERIAL WITNESS DETENTION
arguably both myopic and incomplete. 57 Unfortunately, the
court may have selectively read the legislative history of the
statute and posited a somewhat slanted portrayal of the grand
jury's function with regard to criminal proceedings. 58
A. Why the Grand Jury Proceeding Fits Within the Meaning of
"Criminal Proceeding"
The grand jury determines whether or not to allow the start
of a criminal prosecution. 59 The proceeding has been described
as "an ancient component of the criminal process ' 60 and has
evolved with the United States' criminal justice system.61 The
Bacon court, in concluding that a grand jury investigation fits
within the meaning of a "criminal proceeding," 62 noted that "[i]t
a court would be forced to rely on 'a mere statement by a responsible official, such as
the United States Attorney.' ") (quoting Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943
(9th Cir. 1971). But see infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
57 See Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 292. The Doe court described the Awadallah
court's research as a "three-and-a-half star tour of the legislative history." Id. at
293.
58 See supra note 54-55 and accompanying text; see also Bacon, 449 F.2d at
939-40 (interpreting the language of the federal material witness statute in detail).
59 See HARRY SUBIN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTIONS § 2.2(b) (1993) ("The indictment is the formal charge made by the grand
jury against the defendant. It may follow the issuance of a complaint. It may also be
used to initiate the criminal process."); see also Bacon, 449 F.2d at 939 ("The grand
jury carries out its investigative function with the specific purpose of determining
whether probable cause exists to institute criminal prosecutions.").
60 SUBIN, supra note 59, § 9.5(a). Harry Subin states:
An ancient component of the criminal process, the grand jury once was an
independent entity, a device to screen allegations of crime so that persons
would not be made to stand trial unless sufficient evidence existed. With
the advent of the professional prosecutor, however, the grand jury's
independence all but vanished, and it is essentially a creature of the
prosecutor who "advises" it.
Id; see also LEROY D. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL
POWER 66-67 (1975). Clark states:
The courts have rationalized the broad grand jury power to inquire by
saying that the suspect can at least be summoned, for he might waive any
privileges he has not to testify. In this sense, the subpoena is tantamount
to that issued to require a witness to testify at a criminal trial, or roughly
analogous to an arrest and the beginning of a police interrogation.
Id.
61 See Benjamin E. Rosenberg, A Proposed Addition to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure: Requiring the Disclosure of the Prosecutor's Legal Instructions
to the Grand Jury, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1443 ("The grand jury serves as the
government's criminal investigative arm, helping the prosecutor gather evidence by
issuing subpoenas for witnesses and documents.").
62 See supra note 6.
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is incongruous to say that a proceeding before the body charged
by the Constitution with initiating criminal prosecutions does
not amount to a proceeding in a criminal case prior to a
verdict."63  Though grand juries are often the target of sharp
criticism for their deference to the prosecutor, 64 such criticisms
only bolster the conclusion that such proceedings fit within the
meaning of a criminal proceeding. 65
B. Judicial Deference to Prosecutors on Materiality and the
Drastic Safeguards Designed To Prevent Such Abuse
The Awadallah court bolstered its conclusion that the
federal material witness statute is inapplicable to grand jury
proceedings by positing the specter of excessive judicial
deference to United States Attorneys. 66 The court reasoned that
because of the secret nature of the grand jury's investigations,6 7
there would be "no reasonable way to determine whether a
witness's testimony is material to the grand jury investigation. '" 68
63 Bacon, 449 F.2d at 939-40. The court cited to 18 U.S.C. § 3771, which states
in pertinent part that "[t]he Supreme Court of the United States shall have the
power to prescribe ... rules of pleading, practice, and procedure with respect to any
or all proceedings prior to and including verdict, or finding of guilty or not guilty by
the court .. "). Id. at 939. Section 3771, however, has since been repealed. See Pub.
L. No. 100-702, § 404(a), 102 Stat. 4651 (1988).
64 See supra note 60; see also Rosenberg, supra note 61, at 1443 ("The grand
jury's most bitter critics ... contend that the grand jury would indict a ham
sandwich if the prosecutor asked it to do so.") (citations omitted).
65 See supra notes 59-64.
66 See United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(discussing the reasons judges rely on United States Attorneys for a determination
whether a witness is material).
67 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); see, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 231
(7th Cir. 1982) (describing the Grand Jury and the "grave importance of secrecy
with respect to all aspects of its investigatory processes"); see also HANDBOOK ON
ANTITRUST GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS 55 (Ray A. Hartwell III & Christopher J.
Mugel eds., 1988) ("Thus, Rule 6(e) prohibits grand jurors, government attorneys
and their agents, and court reporters from disclosing matters occurring before the
grand jury. But it does not impose obligations of secrecy on grand jury witnesses.");
HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, GRAND JURY PRACTICE § 3.04[2] (2003) ("A knowing
violation of the Rule is punishable by contempt."). But see Sara Sun Beale & James
E. Felman, The Consequences of Enlisting Federal Grand Juries in the War on
Terrorism: Assessing the USA Patriot Act's Changes to Grand Jury Secrecy, 25
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 699, 707-08 (2002) ('The USA PATRIOT Act represents a
marked departure from past changes to grand jury secrecy rules. The Act permits
disclosure, without court order, to a long list of federal agencies with duties
unrelated to law enforcement.").
68 Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 63.
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In In re Doe, the court demonstrated that such a conclusion is
unfounded and at odds with the limited appellate precedent on
point. 69 Deference to a United States Attorney is also in keeping
with the intimate, historic relationship between the prosecutor
and the grand jury.70 In fact, many critics of the grand jury
system take judicial deference to the prosecutor for granted in
their scathing assessments of the extensive power that a
prosecutor wields over the panel.7 1
There are two compelling disincentives for a United States
Attorney to fraudulently present the materiality of a witness'
testimony: (1) the Fourth Amendment 72 and (2) the potential for
civil liability.73  First, evidence gathered in a manner that
violates the Fourth Amendment will not be admitted at trial.7 4
69 See In re Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[T]hree appellate
courts-the Ninth Circuit in Bacon and two others-have ruled that a court
weighing the propriety of a material witness warrant for a grand jury witness
should determine materiality based on the representation of the prosecutor, lest
grand jury secrecy be compromised") (citing Bacon v. Unites States, 449 F.2d 933,
943 (9th Cir. 1971); In re De Jesus Berrios, 706 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1983); United
States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1982)).
70 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 67, § 4.02[2] (2003) ("The prosecutor wields
enormous control over the functioning of the grand jury... Almost without
exception, the prosecutor decides what subjects should be investigated and is then
responsible for gathering and presenting the evidence."). The prosecutor also serves
as "legal advisor" to the grand jury panel. See id. ('The prosecutor advises the grand
jury on the relevance of the evidence presented, the elements of the offense charged,
and the 'controlling legal principles."') (citations omitted); see also SUBIN, supra note
59, § 12.3 ("As a practical matter, however, the grand jury is under the prosecutor's
complete control .... Essentially, therefore, the investigation and indictment
process is regulated by the Justice Department, and the good faith of individual
prosecutors."). Grand jury independence has been questioned at length both in
academic circles and at common law. See generally YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 685 (9th ed. 1999) ("Today, the critics argue, the sweeping
powers of the grand jury are exercised in reality by the prosecutor alone.").
71 See EDWARD F. COOKE, A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTION 103
(7th ed. 2002) ("As it has evolved in the American environment, [the grand jury] has
become an entirely one-sided proceeding dominated by what evidence the prosecutor
presents, or better still, does not present.").
72 U.S. CONST. amend IV ("[N]o warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
73 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage. . . subjects... any citizen of the United
States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ... ").
74 See 27 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 641.20 (3d
ed. 2003) ("In addition to evidence obtained directly through the violation of the
Fourth Amendment, the 'fruit' of such illegal conduct must also be excluded from
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However, the exclusionary rule75 does not apply in the grand
jury setting.76 Such narrow applicability, though, should only
lessen its deterrent effect for prosecutors bent on indictments
and not convictions. 77 Second, the detained witness will be able
to question the "propriety"78 of the warrant for his arrest7 9 and
may subsequently bring a civil action.80 Such civil actions
trial.") (citation omitted); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding
that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
is ... inadmissible in a state court"). But see People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150
N.E. 585, 587 (1926) ('The criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered."); ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, GOD AND MAN IN THE LAW: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 106 (1997) ("It is perfectly
clear, for example, that the makers of the Fourth Amendment did not mean to
require, by institution of that provision, the exclusion of tainted evidence in criminal
prosecutions."); ELLIS WASHINGTON, THE INSEPARABILITY OF LAW AND MORALITY:
THE CONSTITUTION, NATURAL LAW, AND THE RULE OF LAW 16 (2002) ("[T]he
exclusionary rule is ... the type of pseudo-constitutional doctrine that can evolve
from a judicial activist Supreme Court with a radical liberal political agenda."). See
generally Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1983) (discussing the history of the exclusionary rule).
75 MOORE ET AL., supra note 74, § 641.20 [1] ('The exclusionary rule provides
that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible at
trial.... The Fourth Amendment does not expressly preclude the use of evidence
obtained in violation of one of its strictures, and the exclusionary rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to deter future violations of Fourth Amendment rights.")
(citation omitted).
76 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345, 349-55 (1974).
77 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 67, § 403[4] ("[D]enying this judicially-created
remedy in the grand jury context neither prejudices criminal defendants nor
encourages police misconduct because a defendant can always bring post-indictment
proceedings to seek to exclude the fruits of an illegal search from trial.")
78 United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing the
materiality requirement and observing that "a materiality representation by a
responsible official of the United States Attorney's Office strikes a proper and
adequate balance between protecting the secrecy of the grand jury's investigation
and subjecting an individual to an unjustified arrest").
79 Id. ('The subject of the warrant will, of course, always be able to challenge
the propriety of the issuance of a warrant on the ground that the prosecutor
knowingly presented a false representation of materiality."); see also Bacon v.
United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (1971) (discussing the materiality of the witness'
testimony and concluding that "a mere statement by a responsible official" is
sufficient to satisfy the materiality requirement).
80 See REX E. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 78 (1981)
(describing civil suits as a method for limiting illegal conduct by police officers and
explaining that the ineffectiveness of such suits led to the formation of the
exclusionary rule). The exclusionary rule has many critics, some of whom focus on
the fact that it does nothing for a person who was seized or searched. Id. ("Proposals
for reform have called for abandonment of the exclusionary rule and replacement of
it by a forceful and effective law allowing civil actions by citizens whose
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apparently have a mild deterrent effect.8 ' Moreover, United
States Attorneys largely enjoy reputations of great integrity; one
would therefore expect that such principled men and women
would not knowingly present evidence gathered in a manner
that violates the Fourth Amendment.8 2
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BALANCING TEST
In concluding that the federal material witness statute does
not apply to grand jury proceedings, the Awadallah court
articulated serious concerns about the constitutionality of
Awadallah's detention.8 3 The court reasoned that the detention
of a material witness merited careful scrutiny under the Fourth
Amendment.8 4 In particular, the court relied on Terry v. Ohio8 5
constitutional rights (to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures) have been
infringed."); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351 n.22 (2001)
(discussing civil liability and concluding that "even where personal liability does not
ultimately materialize, the mere 'specter of liability' may inhibit public officials in
the discharge of their duties ... for even those officers with airtight qualified
immunity defenses are forced to incur 'the expenses of litigation'.. .") (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
81 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 74, § 641.20[2] ("Courts believe that the
exclusionary rule serves to protect individuals from unlawful searches under the
Fourth Amendment. Civil actions may provide some deterrence, but the practical
problems involved in prosecuting a civil suit, such as cost, delay and a jury's
reluctance to give money damages to an unsympathetic plaintiff, mitigate against
their effectiveness.")
82 See Ryan E. Mick, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act: Solution or
Revolution? 86 IOWA L. REV. 1251, 1267-68 (2001) ("The United States Attorney is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty..
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done.") (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935)).
83 United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 80 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
("The prolonged detention of a previously cooperative material witness for a grand
jury may have been so unreasonable as to have violated Awadallah's Fourth
Amendment rights even if the detention was authorized by statute.").
84 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend IV; JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS 153 (3d ed. 2001):
[T]he Fourth [Amendment] was written with specific British abuses in
mind. In attempts to detect tax fraud and violations of various embargoed
goods, British agents often swept down on suspects with general warrants,
good throughout the life of the monarch under whose authority they were
issued, that gave practically unlimited authority to search and that
stimulated great resentment.
But see In re Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Because the giving of
evidence during the investigative stage of a criminal case imposes no lesser
obligation than the giving of trial testimony, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that it is reasonable to detain even a person known to be innocent .... ). In
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and explained the extent to which "law enforcement officers
could intrude on a person's liberty given their interest in
'effective crime prevention and detection,' the same interests
that underlie grand jury investigations."8 6  The specific
parameters within which law enforcement officials may
appropriately act are sensitively dependent upon the weighing of
governmental and individual interests.8 7  Ignoring this
fundamental tenet of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence8 8 risks
"making detention the norm and liberty the exception."8 9
addition, the Doe court asserted that the Awadallah court perceived a Fourth
Amendment issue where there was none. See id. ("[Tihere is a substantial body of
case law ... showing that the constitutional problem discerned by the Awadallah
court does not exist.").
85 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968) (holding that, in the absence of probable cause, law
enforcement officers can still seize a person and subject them to a frisk for weapons
upon a showing of reasonable suspicion that the person was going to engage in
violent activity). It is ironic, to some extent, that the court cites Terry to call the
constitutionality of Awadallah's detention into question because, in the view of some
commentators, Terry was a landmark case that weakened the Fourth Amendment.
See, e.g., THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA AFTER 200 YEARS 126-27 (David
J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1993) [hereinafter THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
MODERN AMERICA] (describing Terry as a crucial shift in precedent and noting that
"once the shield formed by the probable cause standard was pierced... it was
difficult to prevent further mutilation").
86 Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (1968)).
87 Id. at 77 ("To determine the constitutionality of a seizure we must balance
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion."); see THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA, supra note 85, at 122
('The fundamental question addressed by the Fourth Amendment then is this:
Under what circumstances must the individual's right to be let alone yield to the
common good?"); PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (Stephen E. Gottlieb
ed., 1993). There is extensive criticism of the use of such balancing tests. Id.
("Among the critics of the Court's balancing analysis are two different schools: one
rejects the propriety of any balancing or cost-benefit analysis in the adjudication of
constitutional rights; the other.., accepts the Court's policy-making role, but
criticizes the adequacy of its analysis in particular cases."). With a term as vague as
"reasonableness," there are bound to be critics. See id. ("Reasonableness is a vital
common-law concept with a well-respected pedigree, and the academic criticisms of
many recent Fourth Amendment cases are, at bottom, disagreements over what is
reasonable in context."). Some critics consider judicial balancing to be a subterfuge
for the courts' direct regulation of legislatures and the executive branch. See, e.g.,
STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON 103-04 (1998)
("[U]nder cover of the language of... 'balancing,' the courts are simply carrying out
the regulatory or supervisory function of demanding that the state give reasons for
its actions, and then scrutinizing the officially supplied reasons.").
88 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
89 Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 79.
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A. A Grim Outlook: Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence or the
Lack Thereof
Since Terry, Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Fourth
Amendment has erred on the side of facilitating law enforcement
instead of bolstering the protection of individual freedoms. 90 The
federal courts' application of the balancing test as set forth in
Terry, therefore, tends to mitigate the efficacy of the
Amendment. 91  In the lexicon of the Amendment and the
common law on point, Awadallah's detention was a seizure.
92
The courts' weighing of the competing interests93 at stake in
such seizures is most notable for the breadth of considerations
related to law enforcement. 94 That is, someone has his or her
thumb on the jurisprudential scale. 95
Several of Terry's progeny are didactic analogs.96 In United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte,97 for example, the Court applied the
90 THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA, supra note 85, at 126 (describing
the Supreme Court's view of the amendment as "an impediment to effective law
enforcement"). But see MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A
BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 166-67 (1988) ("In the modern period, however, on balance,
the Court's record in the service of individual rights has been admirable.").
91 See THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA, supra note 85, at 127 ("In
light of ... the direct historical connection to abuses suffered under the writs of
assistance, the Court initially was reluctant to balance away the probable cause
requirement .... With the ascension of William Rehnquist... his reluctance soon
dissipated."); RALPH C. CHANDLER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK:
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS § 3:4 (2d ed. 1993) ("[Djecisions of the court have gradually
moved from limiting the scope of permissible searches and seizures to limiting the
scope of the rights of criminal defendants, including the parameters of
permissibility"). There is the potential for dramatic evisceration of the Fourth
Amendment under the apparent auspices of crime control. See Neal A. Maxwell,
Some Thoughts About Our Constitution and Government, in BY THE HANDS OF WISE
MEN: ESSAYS ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 118 (Ray C. Hillam ed., 1979) ("In the last
analysis our constitutional freedoms are far more apt to be tested by the internal
manipulation of smiling Caesars than by external pirates boarding the ship of
state.").
92 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
93 See supra text accompanying note 87.
94 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
95 See INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT
180 (Jack N. Rakove 1990) ("As the one branch of government least accountable to
the public, the judiciary should hesitate long and carefully before imposing its
opinions on the views of the political departments.").
96 The federal courts have considered the reasonableness of a seizure in myriad
contexts since Terry. See, e.g., United States v. Burns, 37 F.3d 276, 277-78 (7th Cir.
1994) (detaining a hotel guest for ten minutes while executing a warrant to search
her room); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 1993) (stopping a
taxi and handcuffing two of the passengers ten to fifteen minutes before placing
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Fourth Amendment to permanent border patrol checkpoints. 98
Authorities set up at a distance from the United States-Mexico
border to stop cars "for brief questioning of [their] occupants
even though there [was] no reason to believe the particular
vehicle contain[ed] illegal aliens."99 Relying in part on Terry, the
Court balanced the relevant interests and concluded that
"[w]hile the need to make routine checkpoint stops is great, the
consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is quite
limited."100  Likewise, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista'01 is a
factually fascinating and telling indication of the Court's
tendency to balance the interests in favor of law enforcement. 10 2
The Court held that "[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe
that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth
Amendment, arrest the offender."'1 3  The initial basis for the
arrest and hour-long incarceration in Atwater was a seatbelt
violation. 104
B. Individual Interests
As described above, the Fourth Amendment serves to protect
individuals from the potentially drastic consequences of an
unfettered application of law enforcement. 0 5 In the wake of
September 11, 2001, great concern has emerged regarding the
continued viability of individual liberty in the midst of
them under arrest).
97 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
98 Id. at 556 ("It is agreed that checkpoint stops are 'seizures' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
99 Id. at 545.
100 Id. at 557. The court conceded, arguendo, that the stops were based on the
physical appearance of the drivers. Id. at 563 ("Thus, even if it be assumed that
such referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we
perceive no constitutional violation.").
101 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
102 See supra note 91.
103 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
104 Id. at 323. See generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996)
(vehicle "pretext" stops).
105 See GEORGE T. FELKENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
216 (1978) ('CThe Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures interposes a wall between the individual and the power of law




unprecedented threats to national security.106 Awadallah's
lengthy detention 10 7 and treatment during that period108 are
paradigmatic examples of the kind of zealous seizures that the
Fourth Amendment serves to prevent. 10 9
C. The Government's Interests
In recent months, dedicated men and women have been
working at both the state and federal levels to confront the
challenges posed by imminent threats to the safety of the
American public.1 0 The perils of overzealous law enforcement
are, of course, nothing new."' However, citizens today may find
themselves confronting the apparent mutual exclusivity of
national security and individual liberty.112 The government's
interests are undeniably grave; law enforcement officers and the
106 See Lori Sachs, Comment, September 11, 2001: The Constitution During
Crisis: A New Perspective, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1715, 1716 (2002) (discussing the
"fears of thousands of people living in the United States who are concerned that
their rights will be infringed upon by legislation purporting to eliminate terrorism").
107 Awadallah was arrested on September 21, 2001, testified twenty days later,
and was finally charged with a crime, a perjury complaint, on October 21, 2001.
United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). On
December 13, 2001, Awadallah was released on bail. Id. at 59.
108 Id. at 60 ("Awadallah bore the full weight of a prison system designed to
punish convicted criminals as well as incapacitate individuals arrested or indicted
for criminal conduct.").
109 Awadallah's detention is one of a myriad of instances of innovative law
enforcement policies. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Ideas and Trends: Executive
Decisions; A Penchant for Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, Di ("More troubling to
some is a Justice Department policy issued last fall that authorizes monitoring of
conversations between defense lawyers and their imprisoned but not necessarily
convicted clients."). The Patriot Act is perhaps the most significant facilitation of
new law enforcement initiatives. See Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot Act, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 435 (2002) ('The USA Patriot Act's expansion of
government authority has made it a focal point for the ongoing national debate over
balancing protection against terrorism with preserving civil liberties.").
110 See McCarthy, supra note 109, at 435.
111 See THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA, supra note 85, at 120 ("In the
midst of what is often characterized as a 'war' on crime, those provisions of the Bill
of Rights that protect persons accused of criminal conduct sometimes seem like
impediments to the reestablishment of law and order.").
112 See Sachs, supra note 106, at 1737 ('While government was once seen as the
main threat to our liberties, it may now be seen as the solution. According to some,
terrorism has replaced government as the most significant threat to our freedom.").
But see Viet D. Dinh, Freedom and Security After September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 399, 400 (2002) ('CThe dichotomy between freedom and security is not
new, but it is false. For security and freedom are not rivals in the universe of
possible goods; rather, they are interrelated, mutually reinforcing goods.").
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investigative branches of our government face the Herculean
task of restoring both security and the perception thereof. 113 The
arrest and detention of material witnesses for grand jury
proceedings and for trials is one of several tools at the
government's disposal in accomplishing this task.114
CONCLUSION
The federal material witness statute provides authority for
law enforcement officers, under the auspices of the court, to
arrest individuals in order to secure their testimony. This
Comment has asserted that the Awadallah court erred in
holding that this statute does not apply to grand jury
proceedings. On the other hand, the court appropriately
articulated the constitutional concerns implicated by detaining
individuals who have not been charged with a crime. The
detection and prevention of crime has become immeasurably
more complex in recent years, largely due to the sophistication
and ease of communication among perpetrators. Crime,
meanwhile, has taken on dramatic and heartrending new
meanings. The fact remains that liberty ranks first among the
national interests we are seeking to protect. Therefore, the
judiciary faces the unenviable challenge of carefully reserving
detention and punishment for constitutionally permissible
instances.
113 See Dinh, supra note 112, at 400 ("[Terrorists'] objective is to spread fear
among all Americans, preventing our Nation from playing an active part on the
world's stage and our citizens from living their lives in the manner to which they
are accustomed.").
114 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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